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Do Households Fully Share Risk?
Evidence from Ghana
1
Intrahousehold analyses provide new insights into how households make economic
decisions.  Much of the work in economics has traditionally treated the household as a single
economic actor, but a number of studies are providing evidence that the dynamics among
household members affect the outcomes of household economic decisions.  This paper contributes
to our understanding of such models by incorporating the variability of individual incomes into the
analysis of intrahousehold resource allocations, using detailed household survey data from Ghana. 
The intrahousehold literature provides evidence that households do not pool all of their
income.  Recent analyses by Phipps and Burton (1993) and Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) suggest
that the income earned by women has a different effect on household expenditure patterns than
income earned by men.  Studies by Thomas (1993), Schultz (1990), and Thomas and Chen (1993)       In a unified model of the household, individual preferences and incomes are aggregated into a
2
household utility function and budget constraint.  
2
provide evidence against a unified model of the household  by demonstrating that women's
2
unearned income affects household labor and resource allocation decisions in different ways from
men's unearned income.  
Both cooperative and noncooperative bargaining models have been developed which take
the policy and social environment into consideration.  In these models, factors that affect
individual bargaining power influence household economic decisions.  However, even the few
models that incorporate dynamic elements (e.g. Ott, 1995) do not incorporate the seasonal and
annual variability that characterizes incomes in developing countries.  
Much of the literature on income variability focuses on household strategies to minimize
household income fluctuation.  These models assume that the decision-making unit is the
household and that all individuals within the household have the same interest in minimizing
household income variability and will benefit equally from actions to do so.  The underlying
presumption is that by smoothing household income, individual consumption will also be
smoothed.  Researchers have identified a number of different strategies that households use to
minimize household income variability, including diversification of household income sources,
intermarriage with people in areas where the weather shocks may be different, and migration. 
(Alderman and Paxson 1992; Townsend 1995a; and Morduch 1995 discuss this literature.)  These
are all important household strategies.
   The intrahousehold literature, however, encourages us to be much more thoughtful about
relationships and dynamics within households.  Total household welfare may increase by3
encouraging different members of the household to diversify the household portfolio of income-
generating activities.  However, if household members are not certain that the household will
remain intact, or if some individuals receive fewer benefits from sharing income risk, then some
household members may focus on reducing the variability of their individual incomes rather than
household income.  Strategies used by individuals to smooth income may involve choices of risk
sharing with individuals from other households.  
If one of the functions of households is to share at least some risk among members, we
would not expect that all resource allocations are made on the basis of realized individual incomes
in a given year.  We would expect to find consumption smoothing across individuals and across
time.  Resource allocations may be based, in part, on the expected incomes of individuals in a
given period rather than their actual income.  Thus, we may obtain biased results regarding the
intrahousehold allocation of resources if we simply use a static framework that does not take into
account the income variability of both individual and household income.    
Risk Sharing Networks
Much of the recent research on peasant risk management focuses on how risk is shared
among people other than household members.  Members of villages, kin groups, and households
may all share risk.  In a risky environment, community or village systems may develop to insure
peasants against risk.  Solidarity systems provide some means of smoothing consumption within
villages.  But even when looking at risk sharing networks at the village or business level, it may be
important to ask whether the smallest unit of analysis is appropriately the household or the
individual.  4
A number of researchers have asked whether villages provide insurance to households
within the village.  If the village provides full insurance, in the sense that households in the village
pool all of their risk and provide for the consumption needs of all households, the consumption of
individual households would be based only on initial endowments and preferences and on
aggregate shocks, not on household earnings in any given year.  Townsend (1994), using data
from three poor, high-risk villages in semi-arid southern India, statistically rejects the full
insurance model, claiming that villages display considerable but imperfect risk sharing.  Similarly,
he rejects full insurance for ten villages in northern Thailand (Townsend 1995b).  
An alternative hypothesis is that at the village level, there are partial insurance
mechanisms, rather than full insurance mechanisms.  For example, Scott (1976) suggests that a
"moral economy" guarantees subsistence to individuals but does not provide full insurance. Some
of the means of guaranteeing subsistence may not be observable in most household survey data. 
For example, the community may provide short-term labor assistance on a field for someone who
is ill;  providing labor may be less costly than allowing the crops to fail and then providing the
means of subsistence.  Fafchamps (1993) uses the theory of infinitely-repeated games to suggest
that cooperation can be sustained and that a "moral economy" system may be a rational means for
peasants to manage risk.  
Partial risk sharing may be implemented through state contingent credit contracts, as Udry
(1990) finds in Northern Nigeria.  Repayments of credit within the village are dependent on the
realization of random shocks of both borrowers and lenders.   Fafchamps (1994) finds similar
state contingent contracts in the commercial sector of Ghana;  clients share risk with their
suppliers.  5
Finally, we expect that households act to share risk among their members.  Certainly, we
expect that households provide some insurance for those who cannot provide for themselves --
the very old, the very young, the ill, and the disabled.  Discussions of household strategies for risk
management implicitly assume more.  They assume that risk is pooled within the household, even
among those who are able to provide for themselves.  Empirical analyses often use the household
as the smallest unit of analysis.  In part, this is due to data constraints, but it is also due to the
implicit acceptance of unified household models.  If the unified models do not hold, then it is
important to reexamine issues of risk sharing.  For example, Rosenzweig (1992) notes that
households in rural India sell livestock as one means of smoothing consumption.  But the
intrahousehold literature suggests that such sales may have different effects on household
outcomes depending on whether women or men own the livestock and receive this income.
   Thus, although it is important to see how risk is shared within villages, kinship groups, and
households, it is also important to see the individual household members as actors who are trying
to ensure their own well-being.  Risk sharing networks may be networks of individuals -- not
necessarily of households -- with households serving as one component of an individual's risk-
sharing strategy.  For example, Fafchamps' (1994) example of risk sharing in the commercial
sector examines relationships among clients and suppliers.  We would not necessarily expect the
boundaries of these commercial units to overlap exactly with those of households. 
Especially in places such as West Africa, where households are relatively fluid, individuals
may try to minimize their individual exposure to risk.  Individuals want to protect themselves from
the economic risks involved with the dissolution of the household due to divorce or the death of a       Of the 10,832 adults interviewed in the 1991-92 Ghana Living Standards Survey, more women
3
than men reported being divorced or widowed:  211 men reported their marital status as divorced and
75 as widowed while 520 women reported their status as divorced and 553 as widowed.  
6
household member.   For example, it is common in some areas of Ghana for a woman to want to
3
own her own house even when she lives in a house owned by her spouse.  Among some ethnic
groups, when a man dies, his wife (or wives) do not inherit the house; instead the house passes to
the man's sons or brothers.  Especially if she did not produce sons, the wife may not be allowed to
remain in the house where she and her husband lived and raised their children.  
In addition, the structure of households may depend in part on economic forces.  For
example, Doss, Levison and Benefo (1996) find significant changes in household structure during
the period of structural adjustment in Ghana (1984-1992).  During this relatively short period of
time, the average number of people within each household decreased significantly.  If individuals
change the household to which they belong, and especially if they do so in response to economic
factors, then the household may not be the appropriate unit of analysis for theories of risk sharing.
Household Survey Data From Ghana 
This analysis provides a preliminary test of the full risk sharing hypothesis using data from
the 1991-92 Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS3).  
The GLSS3 data offers a unique opportunity to study intrahousehold issues in Africa, since the
income, consumption, and expenditure data are unusually detailed.  In many cases, income and
asset holdings can be disaggregated to the level of individual household members.   Other large-
scale surveys, including the 1987-88 and 1988-89 rounds of the Ghana Living Standards Survey,
do not include questions about individual control of agricultural revenue. 7
One of the challenges in analyzing intrahousehold issues in West Africa is determining the
boundaries of the household.  Especially in rural areas, people live in compounds that may or may
not reflect production and consumption units.  Nuclear or extended family units may also not
coincide with production and consumption units.  For the purposes of the GLSS3 a household
was defined as a group of people who had usually slept in the same dwelling and had taken their
meals together for at least 9 of the 12 months prior to the survey. People who had been away
from the household for more than three months were not considered household members, except
for the person identified as the head of the household, newly-born children, and students and
seasonal workers who had not been part of another household (Republic of Ghana Statistical
Service, 1990).
Interviewers for the GLSS3 were asked to identify the head of each household that they
interviewed.  To incorporate important structural characteristics of the household for the the
analysis in this paper, households are defined as potentially having both a male head and a female
head which are the persons defined in the survey as the head and his or her spouse.  Over half of
the households reported having both a male and a female head.  Households 8
reporting only a female head present comprised 32 percent of the households in the survey.
Using the GLSS definitions of households, household size ranged from one to thirty. 
Mean household size was 4.5 individuals.  Six percent of households were polygynous, with most
of them reporting two wives present, although up to five wives were reported by some
households.  
GLSS3 contains detailed information on expenditure and income.  Data on frequent
expenditures, both food and nonfood, were collected at two-day intervals for rural households
over a period of 14 days and at three-day intervals for urban households over a 30-day period. 
Thus, the information is detailed enough to include, for example, a rural household's expenditures
on pepper and charcoal every two or three days.  
Annual expenditures were obtained for other goods, including education.  For items
infrequently purchased, monthly expenditures were calculated from expenditures over a three-
month or twelve-month period, depending on each household's frequency of purchase of that
particular item.  Imputed values were calculated for housing, where appropriate, and for
consumer durable goods.  
In addition to cash expenses, the survey collected data on the value of certain home-
produced goods, including food.  It was possible to calculate total monthly expenditures for
consumption by including the cash expenses and imputed value of goods produced and consumed
by the household. (Expenses on agricultural inputs were not included.)  The imputed value of
food produced and consumed by the household was calculated based on the household's report of
the price obtainable by selling the items in the market.  
In contrast to previous surveys in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, much of the income data in9
GLSS3 can be assigned to individuals.  Each individual who held land reported detailed
information on each plot held, including answers to questions about who made decisions about
which crops to grow, who decided the level of inputs to use, and who kept the revenue from the
crops on that plot.  Thus, the revenue from agriculture can be assigned to the individual who
made the decisions and kept the revenue.  Using this information for each of the plots and the
information on which crops were harvested from each plot, almost all of the value of food
produced and consumed by the household can also be assigned to individuals.  This person is not
necessarily the head of the household or the holder of the land.  In addition, wage income was
collected on each individual household member over the age of seven.  The person responsible for
agricultural processing activities and non-farm enterprises is also identified in the data.    
Consumption data cannot be disaggregated.  Medical expenses in the two weeks prior to
the survey and education expenses are the only categories of expenses in GLSS3 that can be
assigned to individuals.  For many household expenditures, it is theoretically impossible to
determine which household member received the goods, especially for shared goods such as
housing and utilities.  Thus, this analysis examines the effects of shocks to men's and women's
crop incomes on household expenditure patterns.  
Theoretical Framework of Risk Sharing Within Households
The following framework provides a model of households in which individuals maximize
utility independently but can share all, none, or some of their individual income risk with other
household members.  In this framework, it is possible to test the hypothesis that household
members share all of their income risk.  Full risk sharing within households is consistent with amax
x j






       The use of permanent and transitory income in this context follows Paxson's (1992) terminology,
4
which is based on Friedman (1957).  An alternative term for permanent income would be expected
income (or average income over a relatively short number of years).  In this paper, permanent income





unified household model  and with the literature examining household strategies for risk
management.  The finding that households do not fully share risk would cause us to question the
current framework for understanding risk management in developing countries and encourage us
to develop theories that see individuals as the primary actors, working within the context and
constraints of their households.
In the proposed model, each person maximizes his or her own utility facing a budget
constraint which is composed of permanent income, transitory income, and net transfers from
other household members.  
4
Each household member j maximizes his or her utility u  according the following:
where x is a vector of goods consumed by j which may include both purchased and home
j
produced goods; " is the proportion of income risk that individual j shares with other household
j
members; $ is the amount of the household transitory income received by individual j; and T  is
j j















p is the vector of prices corresponding to x;  y G   is the permanent income of individual j; 2  is the
 j  j
transitory income of individual j; s  is the shock to j's individual income; k indexes all household
 j
members; and y  is the total income earned by individual j.  
j
The proportion of risk that is pooled by individual j is ".  The level of " determines to
jj
what extent an income shock to individual j is shared among all household members.  If any
income risk is pooled among household members, shocks to total household income will in
general be proportionally less than shocks to individual income.  If "=1 for all members of the
j
household, all income risk is pooled and each individual's consumption depends on his or her
permanent income, transfers, and household transitory income.  If "=0 for any member j, then
j
that individual's consumption depends only on his or her permanent income, net transfers,  and his
or her individual income shocks.  If " is between 0 and 1, then the individual is sharing some of
j
his or her income risk with household members and both shocks to his or her income and shocks
to other household members will affect his or her consumption. 
This is expressed formally in the definition of transitory income, 2 , which is the sum of
 j
two components.  The first term is the portion of j's shock that is not pooled with other 12
household members. This portion of j's shock directly affects his or her transitory income.  The
second term is j's portion of household transitory income.  Each individual's shock is the
difference between their earnings in a given period and their permanent income.  The sum of the
pooled portions of the shocks of all household members is the household transitory income.
The determination of T , ", and $ can be modelled as being the result of a bargaining
 j jj
process.  For example, Carter and Katz (1992) use a cooperative bargaining model to determine
the levels of transfers among household members.  This paper does not detail the implications of
determining these parameters within a household bargaining process.
Estimating Shocks to Crop Income
Estimating the shocks to household income poses a number of theoretical and empirical
challenges.  First, much of the variance in household income is endogenous.  Changes in earnings
due to illness may  reflect past decisions about medical expenditures or the allocation of nutrients
among household members.  Individual choices to participate in risky but potentially lucrative
activities are also made within the household.  Thus, variation in income is to a large extent an
endogenous outcome of the household decision process.  To test the hypothesis of full risk
pooling, it is necessary to test the effects of exogenous shocks on household economic decisions. 
Rainfall variability is used in this analysis as an exogenous shock.  By examining whether rainfall
shocks to men's and women's crop incomes differently affect household expenditures, we can test
whether household members ENDFIELD        Ghana has 10 regions for administrative purposes and three distinct ecological zones -- coastal,
5
forested, and savanna.  Many of the administrative zones fall into more than one ecological zone.
Additional rainfall data was available, but it could not be matched with the GLSS data. 
       Some stations did not have complete information over the 30 year period.  In these cases, all of
6
the data that were available were used.
13
fully insure one another.  
   Rainfall data were provided by the Ghana Meteorological Services Department.  Fifteen
different rainfall areas are defined, based on their administrative region and ecological zone.  
5
Using time-series data from 1961-1992, the mean and variance for each location are calculated for
this period.   
6
Using time-series rainfall data combined with detailed information on the crops grown and
inputs used, crop incomes for the survey year are predicted for both men and women in each
household.  Permanent crop incomes are calculated by substituting average rainfall over the thirty-
year period into the same equations (details provided below).  Shocks to crop income are defined
as the difference between the crop incomes for the survey year and the permanent crop incomes. 
Table 1 provides information on the instruments used to predict crop income.  The crop
incomes of men and women are treated as separate observations.  Measures of rainfall for each
region are interacted with a set of dummy variables indicating whether or not each of 11 major
crops was grown.  Since the timing of rainfall is important to crop production, the measures of
rainfall used are rainfall in March (the initial month of the rainy season), the sum of rainfall for the
quarter consisting of April, May and June, and the sum of rainfall for the quarter consisting of
July, August, and September.  The squared values of these measures of rainfall are also included
to allow for nonlinear effects.        Annual rainfall is normalized as follows: (previous year's rainfall - mean annual rainfall) /
7
variance of annual rainfall.  This captures the deviation from average rainfall.  
14
   Since different households were interviewed during the different seasons, it is necessary to
determine the appropriate rainfall season for each household.  For staple grains, field crops, and
cash crops, the survey asked about the production and value of crops harvested and sold within
the prior twelve months.  The rainfall measures that are used for these crops are the rainfall data
for the year prior to the last harvest (R , R , and R ).  By contrast, root crops, fruits, vegetables
12 3
and other crops are harvested piecemeal.  Data were collected on the harvest of these crops for
the two weeks prior to the survey.  Thus, the rainfall measures that are appropriate for these
crops are the rainfall data for the year prior to the survey (R , R , and R ).  
45 6
For other crops, rainfall data from different time periods are used.  Specifically, the
dummy variable for whether cocoa is grown is interacted with the total annual rainfall since the
timing of rainfall is less important for cocoa.  Annual rainfall is interacted with the dummies
indicating whether any of the plots were irrigated and whether any fertilizer was used.  Finally,
normalized annual rainfall  is interacted with the amount of area planted to crops. These different
7
variables provide more detailed information about the effect of rainfall on crop income.  The crop
and input dummy variables also capture some of the differences in land quality, since land of
different types and quality may be planted to different crops and receive different combinations of
inputs.  
It is not possible to determine how much area was planted to each of the specific crops. 
Most of the land is intercropped, frequently with several crops, and thus the survey did not ask






does not try to capture the relative amounts of land planted to different crops. 
Table 2 provides the results of the regression used to predict crop income for the survey
year.  Crop income (y , where i indexes men and women) is predicted using the rainfall variables
 i
R -R .  Using the same coefficients presented in Table 2, permanent crop income (y G ) was
16  i
predicted using average rainfall over the thirty year time series instead of rainfall prior to the
survey date.  Since average rainfall over a thirty year period is used, it is not necessary to
differentiate between the appropriate rain cycle for crops harvested annually and those harvested
piecemeal:  R  was substituted for R  and R , R  was substituted for R  and R , and R  was
71 4 82 9
5
substituted for R  and R .     
36
Shocks to crop incomes (s) are calculated as the difference between crop income in the
i
survey year and permanent crop income:
Using this approach, about half of the households have positive shocks to their crop incomes and
half have negative shocks.  This distribution allows the analysis to examine the effects of both
positive and negative shocks.
Crop income represents only a portion of total household income.  For all households in
the sample, crop income represents an average of 30 percent of total household income.  For
households that had land planted to crops, crop income is an average of 49 percent of household
income.  
Empirical Framework to Test Risk Sharing Within HouseholdsTg ’ $1(s m)%$2(s f)%$3(s m(d m)%$4(s f(d f)%$5(Y&s m&





The theoretical model described above provides a framework to empirically test whether
shocks to individual household members' incomes affect household expenditures differently.  With
cross-section data, to observe differences in the influence of individual shocks on household
expenditures, it must be the case that individuals with similar preferences can be grouped.  If
preferences are randomly distributed throughout the population, we would not see any patterns
even if individual shocks do affect household expenditures.  However, there is evidence that men
and women spend income differently.   Thus, we can examine whether shocks to men's and
8
women's incomes affect expenditures differently.  
In addition, we might expect that positive shocks affect household expenditure patterns
differently from negative shocks.  A spline function is used to allow the estimated coefficients to
differ for positive and negative shocks (Greene, 1991).  This approach requires that the function
be continuous but allows a kink at the point where shocks equal zero.  
The following model was estimated: 
where:
T  is household budget share on a category of goods, such as food, g
s  is the shock to crop incomes,
 i
d = 1 if s  >0
 i i
     9 0 if s  #0       i = m, f
 i
Y is total household income, and17
Z is a vector of demographic, location, and education variables.  
The Z vector includes variables indicating the number of household members in each of twelve
age and gender categories, dummy variables indicating the education levels of the male and female
household heads, dummy variables indicating the month in which the household was interviewed,
whether the household was located in an urban (not Accra), semi-urban, or rural area (located in
Accra was the omitted category), whether both a male and female head were present in the
household, and whether the household farmed any land.  Descriptive statistics of these are
presented in Table 3.  Household income, excluding shocks to crop income, is also included.  This
term controls for the permanent income and non-rainfall shocks to the incomes of all household
members.  
To test the hypothesis of full risk sharing in households, the coefficients on men's shocks
and women's shocks can be examined.  If the estimated coefficients on negative shocks, $  and $ , 12
are significantly different, then we would reject the full risk sharing model.  Similarly, if the
estimated slopes for the positive shocks (for men the slope is $ +$  and for women the slope is 13
$ + $ ) are different, we reject full risk sharing.  These results would suggest that shocks to men's 24
and women's crop incomes affect household expenditure patterns differently. If households fully
share risk among members, then it should not matter whether the shocks from rainfall variability
accrues to men or women within the household.  
Results 
OLS estimates are used to determine the impact of shocks to men's and women's crop       When the effects for men and women are significantly different from zero and have different
9
signs, they must also be significantly different from each other. 
18
incomes on seven different commodity groups.  These groups represent commodities over which
we might expect men and women to have different preferences.  They include:  food, alcohol,
clothing, education, recreation, remittances, and tobacco.  The estimates are summarized in Table
4.
Negative shocks to men's crop incomes are associated with significantly higher household
budget shares on alcohol and tobacco and with lower budget shares on clothing and education. 
Negative shocks to women's crop incomes are associated with higher budget shares on education
and with lower budget shares on alcohol.  This suggests that when negative shocks occur, the
household does not cut back on alcohol and tobacco relative to other goods when the shock
accrues to men and that the household does not cut back on education relative to other goods
when the shock accrues to women.  However, the household decreases the relative proportions of
clothing and education when the negative shocks accrue to men and the relative proportions of
alcohol when the shocks accrue to women.  
Positive shocks to men's crop income are associated with significantly increased budget
shares on remittances, tobacco, and food and lower budget shares for clothing.  Positive shocks to
women's crop incomes are associated with increased budget shares for food and decreased budget
shares for tobacco. Table 5 summarizes the results.
Two features emerge from these results.  First, there are important differences in the
effects of income shocks for men and women.   Men and women have different priorities and
9
preferences and use resources under their control differently.  In addition, these results suggest19
that men and women do not fully share income risk within households.  Second, positive and
negative shocks have different effects on some commodity groups and these effects also differ for
men and women.  
It should be noted that the effects of shocks to men's and women's crop incomes on food
expenditures are statistically indistinguishable.  Negative shocks have no statistically significant
effect on the budget share on food while positive shocks increase the budget share spent on food. 
The fact that crop income includes the value of food produced and consumed at home may
account for this increase, which on the face of it appears to contradict Engel's law.  It suggests
that households that have a good year disproportionately increase the value of their food
consumption regardless of whether male or female household members received the benefits.  
Conclusion: Risk Sharing Within Households  
These results demonstrate that shocks to crop incomes earned by men and women have
different effects on household expenditure patterns.  Although many of the magnitudes of the
coefficients are small, all of the consumption items except food represent a small portion of the
household budget.  Further research that examines the shocks to all forms of income, rather than
just to crop income, may provide stronger results.  By doing so, we can ask whether the effects of
the shocks are small because the shocks to crop incomes represent a small portion of household
income or because households pool the majority of their income risk.
The results presented here provide evidence that it is important to examine how
individuals manage risk as well as how households manage risk.  Households are one form of risk-
sharing network for individuals, but each individual will have a set of networks that may not20
correspond with those of other household members.  In particular, it will be useful to understand
how men's and women's risk sharing networks differ and whether they have different effects on
consumption smoothing for men, women, and children.  Although this paper showed that men's
and women's income shocks have similar effects on household food expenditure, data on
individual food consumption, if available, would allow us to analyze whether shocks to men's and
women's incomes differently affect the allocation of food among household members.
If household members do not fully share risk, we may find situations in which individuals
prefer to minimize the variability of their own income rather than to participate wholly in a
strategy of minimizing household income variability.  Individuals may prefer not to fully
specialize, but to engage in a larger number of activities, even at the cost of reduced efficiency. 
Individuals are making decisions, within the context and constraints of the household, to insure
themselves against both risk from shocks to income and risk from the dissolution of the
household.
This analysis suggests that men and women make different decisions about how to allocate
their resources when experiencing shocks to crop income.  By examining household expenditure
data in which the income of household members has been aggregated and consumption is being
smoothed over seasons and annual cycles, we may obtain an incorrect picture of intrahousehold
resource allocation.  21
Table 1  Descriptive Statistics on Variables Used to Predict Crop Incomes, Ghana 
1991-92.
                                                                                           Standard
Variable                                                                  Mean       Deviation
Crop income  56,265.17     118,598.24
Area     5724 13.21
Area*normalized annual rainfall        -0.154 13.45
Irrigated (dummy variable)             0.011 0.10
Fertilizer used (dummy variable)       0.072 0.26
Normalized annual rainfall             0.021 1.00
Annual rainfall  1212.81 296.17
R  Rainfall in March, year prior to harvest                76.904 47.00
1
R  Rainfall in April, May, and June, year prior to harvest   570.827 125.69
2
R  Rainfall in July, Aug. and Sept., year prior to harvest 417.338 176.61
3
R  Rainfall in March, year prior to survey                 63.406 43.79
4
R  Rainfall in April, May, and June, year prior to survey   553.919 134.25
5
R  Rainfall in July, Aug. and Sept., year prior to survey  417.338 176.61
6
R  Average rainfall in March            91.718 39.04
7 
R  Average rainfall in April, May, and June    480.90 101.52
8
















Table 1  (continued). 
                                                                                           Standard











 Dummy variables indicating whether or not the crop was grown.
+
Source:  Compiled from Ghana Living Standard Survey, 1991-92.  
Note:  Men's and women's plots are treated as separate observations.
N=2,529.23
Table 2  OLS Estimates Used to Predict Crop Incomes.
Variable                                                      Estimated                  T-
                                                               Coefficient               Statistic
Intercept 14046 3.200
Area     2754.359 14.738
Area*Normalized annual rainfall  234.150 1.123
Irrigation*Annual rainfall  -19.097   -1.228
Fertilizer*Annual rainfall    4.368     0.685
Normalized annual rainfall -913.633 -0.262
Cocoa*Annual rainfall   77.497*** 14.272
Yams*R     -36.604    -0.104
4
Yams*R      92.146   0.690
5
Yams*R     -10.899   -0.107
6
Yams*R *R         0.370    0.159
44
Yams*R *R      -0.117    -0.760
55
Yams*R *R       -0.012    -0.136
66
Rice*R     3048.761** 2.543
1
Rice*R      986.149***   3.497
2
Rice*R     -774.991***   -4.725
3
Rice*R *R     -13.938**   -2.175
11
Rice*R *R        -1.242***   -4.313
22




Sorghum/millet*R -768.245   -1.539
2
Sorghum/millet*R  258.425     0.545
3
Sorghum/millet*R *R  -15.543   -0.647
11
Sorghum/millet*R *R    0.894    1.499
2224
Table 2 (continued).
Variable                                                      Estimated                  T-
                                                               Coefficient               Statistic
Sorghum/millet*R *R   -0.210 -0.640
33
Maize*R    193.157   0.832
1
Maize*R     -22.720   -0.169
2
Maize*R      98.942   0.983
3
Maize*R *R      -0.877     -0.776
11
Maize*R *R      -0.054 -0.348
22
Maize*R *R      -0.060   -0.640
33
Tomatoes*R  149.167 0.514
4
Tomatoes*R -215.166   -1.398
5
Tomatoes*R   62.088  0.575
6
Tomatoes*R *R   -0.613   -0.395
44
Tomatoes*R *R    0.311*   1.712
55
Tomatoes*R *R   -0.047   -0.471
66
Cassava*R     -183.760 -0.591
4
Cassava*R    371.592**   2.554
5
Cassava*R  -189.077*  -1.672
6
Cassava*R *R      -0.518   -0.279
44
Cassava*R *R      -0.416** -2.525
55
Cassava*R *R      0.127 1.299
66
Plantain*R -399.906   -1.054
4
Plantain*R  -31.628   -0.184
5
Plantain*R 6   56.272 0.390
6
Plantain*R *R    1.497     0.625
44
Plantain*R *R    0.062 0.315
55
Plantain*R *R  -0.054 -0.447
6625
Table 2  (continued). 
Variable                                                      Estimated                  T-
                                                               Coefficient               Statistic
Cocoyam*R    317.562  0.825
4
Cocoyam*R  -318.044*  -1.801
5
Cocoyam*R    293.338*  1.981
6
Cocoyam*R *R      -1.223   -0.515
44
Cocoyam*R *R      0.267 1.313
55








Groundnut*R *R    4.944 1.190
11
Groundnut*R *R   -0.156    -0.702
22
Groundnut*R *R    0.134  1.23
33
Okro*R      869.350**  2.395
4
Okro*R     -108.428 -0.694
5
Okro*R      -26.223  -0.237
6
Okro*R *R     -3.234  -1.324
44
Okro*R *R        0.068   0.377
55
Okro*R *R        0.012  0.116
66
Pepper*R    -681.640*  -1.966
4
Pepper*R  104.966  0.640
5
Pepper*R   60.637  0.537
6
Pepper*R *R       1.836  0.848
44
Pepper*R *R      -0.109 -0.569
55
Pepper*R *R      -0.065 -0.631
6626
*, ** and *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
R  = Rainfall in March, year prior to harvest
1
R = Rainfall in April, May and June, year prior to harvest
2 
R  = Rainfall in July, August, and September, year prior to harvest 
3
R  = Rainfall in March, year prior to survey
4
R = Rainfall in April, May and June, year prior to survey
5 
R  = Rainfall in July, August, and September, year prior to survey
6
N=2,528   R-square = 0.300    F-value=14.627
Table 3  Descriptive Statistics on Variables Used to Estimate the Effects of Shocks to Men's
and Women's Crop Incomes on Budget Shares. 
Variable                                                       Mean         Standard
                                                                                Deviation
Total household income (cedis) 84,998.13 376,916.39
Dummy if grew crops  0.555 0.50
Shock to women's crop income    -469.494  10,316.68
Shock to men's crop income    -970.164  22,176.92
# of male children (age 5-9) 0.400 0.68
# of male youth (age 10-14) 0.329 0.63
# of male adults (age 15-49) 0.916 0.91
# of male older adults (age 50-64) 0.158 0.37
# of male elders (age 65+) 0.083 0.28
# of female infants (age 0-4) 0.359 0.61
# of female children (age 5-9) 0.361 0.64  
# of female youth (age 10-14) 0.306 0.58
# of female adults (age 15-49) 1.056 0.93
# of female older adults (age 50-64) 0.183 0.41
# of female elders (age 65+) 0.093 0.30
Male head--completed 4 years primary education    0.40 0.49
Male head--attended secondary school 0.30  0.46
Male head--completed "0" level  0.06 0.23
Female head--completed 4 years primary education  0.33 0.47  
Female head--attended secondary school 0.09 0.28 
Female head--completed "0" level   0.01 0.11  
Male and female head present 0.501 0.5028
Table 3  (continued). 
Variable                                                        Mean            Standard
                                                                                     Deviation
Budget Shares:
  Food    0.558 0.170 
  Alcohol 0.023 0.043 
  Education 0.021 0.040
  Clothing  0.076 0.055
  Recreation 0.035 0.037
  Tobacco 0.007 0.023
Location:
  Accra 0.102 0.302
  Other urban 0.248 0.432
  Semi-urban 0.207 0.405
  Rural 0.651 0.477




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5  Summary of Effects of Men's and Women's Shocks to Crop Incomes on Budget
Shares.
Positive Shocks to Women's Crop Incomes:
Food  +
Tobacco -
Negative Shocks to Women's Crop Incomes:
Alcohol  -
Education +











Note:  Only shocks that are statistically significant are included on this table. 31
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